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Paving the Way for an Evolutionary Social Constructivism
Abstract: 
The idea has recently taken root that evolutionary theory and social 
constructivism are less antagonistic than most theorists thought, 
and we have even seen attempts at integrating constructivist and 
evolutionary approaches to human thought and behaviour. We argue in 
this article that although the projected integration is possible, 
indeed valuable, the existing attempts have tended to be vague or 
overly simplistic about the claims of social constructivists. We 
proceed by examining how to give more precision and substance to the 
research programme of evolutionary social constructivism, a task we 
accomplish by focussing on the specific selection pressures that may 
have shaped the psychological and cultural mechanisms that give rise 
to  social  constructions.  The  benefit  of  such  an  integration  for 
social constructivism is to have a solid foundation in the natural 
sciences.  For  evolutionists,  evolutionary  social  constructivism 
offers  a  wider  assortment  of  methods  with  which  to  study  the 
interplay between culture and human nature. 
Keywords:  social  constructivism,  evolutionary  theory,  maladaptive 
culture 
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Paving the Way for an Evolutionary Social Constructivism
Did our sexual preferences and mating patterns evolve in the 
Pleistocene? Can one study present-day homosexuality without so much 
as a nod in the direction of the cultural changes that gave rise to 
the  modern  concept  of  homosexuality?  Is  the  way  we  understand 
ourselves profoundly influenced by politics and ideology? Are mental 
disorders  failures  of  naturally  selected  functions  or  are  they 
created by apparatuses and techniques of power? Since the rise of 
the sociobiological approach in human behavioural sciences, social 
constructivists and Darwinians have been engaged in what seems to be 
a  kind  of  turf  war  over  these  and  similar  questions.  Social 
constructivists attack evolutionary psychologists because they see 
evolutionary psychology as a pseudoscientific cover for a plethora 
of reactionary attitudes like sexism, racism, and so on (compare 
Travis  2003).  Similarly,  behavioural  ecologists  and  evolutionary 
psychologists  tend  to  be  less  than  sympathetic  to  social 
constructivism, which they portray as a rubber ideology that lacks 
any  and  all  scientific  standards  and  that  prides  itself  in  its 
nonsensical vocabulary (Kruger 2002; Gross and Levitt 1994). 
As is often the case in many academic disputes, the parties involved 
are not all that well informed about the central tenets, to say 
nothings  of  the  subtleties,  of  the  adverse  theory  (Segerstråle 
2000). Consequently, it is hard to imagine how social constructivism 
or evolutionary psychology could ever profit from the arguments put 
forward by their opponents. Hacking notes, correctly, that “[P]ublic 
scientists shout at sociologists, who shout back. You almost forget 
that there are issues to discuss.” (Hacking 1999: vii) Recently, 
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however, some theoreticians – mostly from the Darwinian side – have 
taken up the role of appeaser or bridge builder (Mallon and Stich 
2000;  Plotkin  2002;  compare  also  Dickins  2004;  Shakespeare  and 
Erickson 2000). They argue that evolutionary approaches to human 
behaviour and social constructivism are not mutually exclusive, and 
that it might even be possible to integrate both fields into a new 
academic  discipline,  called  “evolutionary  social  constructivism” 
(Wilson 2005). Suggestive as the idea may be, existing proposals for 
this  integration  are  still  very  much  in  need  of  correction  and 
elaboration. What we would like to do here is give the research 
programme of evolutionary social constructivism (ESC) the necessary 
precision and substance, by considering ways in which evolution can 
explain why we socially construct things. 
Obviously, our concern can be seen as part of the broader desire of 
integrating sociology and biology. In this debate, we do not defend 
a biological reductionism, but rather a genuine integration. Whereas 
biological reductionism would just correct naïve versions of social 
constructivism,  ESC  also  aims  at  correcting  naïve  -  and 
scientifically  often  dubious  -  evolutionary  approaches  to  human 
behaviour. Such naïve evolutionary approaches are widespread, and 
certainly not limited to the field of evolutionary psychology. Even 
theorists  like  Plotkin  have  argued  that  social  constructivism 
ultimately fails to understand the nature and origin of so-called 
“social  constructions”  (Plotkin  2002).  However,  it  probably  goes 
without saying that the bridges ESC might build between nature and 
culture – or between “evolutionary nativism” and “blank slatism” – 
dovetail more with the Darwinian theories of Sperber, Richerson, 
D.S.  Wilson,  Plotkin  and  their  likes,  than  with  the  “narrow” 
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evolutionary psychology of Tooby, Cosmides and Buss (Wilson 2003; 
Mameli 2007). 
Section 1 sketches out why evolutionary social scientists and social 
constructivists are usually so hostile towards each other. Section 2 
examines what is meant by “social constructivism”. There are many 
varieties of social constructivism, which makes it both hard and 
necessary to pin the beast down. Section 3 attempts to explicate how 
four core elements of social constructivism can be integrated into 
evolutionary reasoning about human beings. A discussion of ESC’s 
implications for current and future research concludes this essay. 
Introducing the Problem
Dobzhansky’s  dictum,  that  “nothing  in  biology  makes  sense 
except in the light of evolution” (Dobzhansky 1973: 125), reflects 
the synthetic potential of neo-Darwinian theory of evolution. Today, 
most biologists are convinced that evolutionary theory is crucial to 
the  project  of  unifying  all  areas  of  biological  research: 
palaeontology, embryology, molecular biology, ecology, and genetics. 
Most  proponents  of  evolutionary  psychology  and  human  behavioural 
ecology go out of their way to emphasize the integrative power of 
Darwinism;  evolutionary  theory,  they  argue,  should  be  the 
cornerstone of all psychological subdisciplines (and of the social 
sciences in general). After all, the insight that the human mind is 
shaped  by  natural  and  sexual  selection  to  solve  the  adaptive 
problems that our ancestors confronted evidently affects cognitive, 
social,  developmental,  personality,  and  clinical  psychology.i One 
undeniable  result  of  this  attempt  to  “darwinize”  psychology  and 
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related fields is that it has made the compatibility with Darwinism 
the  make  or  break  criterion  of  every  psychological  theory  and 
approach. This compatibility with Darwinism is usually thought to 
imply  a  break  with  what  Leda  Cosmides  and  John  Tooby  have 
notoriously dubbed the “Standard Social Science Model” (SSSM), that 
is, the view that the mind is a blank slate completely determined by 
an autonomous or extrinsic system of symbols and values (Tooby and 
Cosmides 1992; see also Pinker 2002). 
Even if the SSSM is not, in spite of what Tooby and Cosmides say, 
the prevalent (“standard”) model in the social sciences (Levy 2004), 
a  number  of  sociological  and  psychological  theories  are  closely 
aligned with it; social constructivism is undoubtedly at the head of 
this list. It has defined itself time and again as anti-naturalistic 
(Cheah 1996; Bauman 1999). Obviously, its anti-naturalism should not 
be identified with a commitment to miraculous interventions or, in 
Dennett’s  words,  divine  skyhooks  (Dennett  1995).  Social 
constructivists are only antinaturalistic in the sense that they 
reject the image of the human subject as a natural given. According 
to  constructivists,  humans  are  no  natural  creatures,  but  rather 
effects of cultural processes. In short, they seem to promote a 
Münchhausen-like account of culture, in which culture provides its 
own foundations. The words of Berger and Luckmann clearly illustrate 
the  social  constructivist  bootstrapping  of  culture:  “Man's  self-
production is always, and of necessity, a social enterprise. Men 
together produce  a  human  environment,  with  the  totality  of  its 
socio-cultural and psychological formations.” (Berger and Luckmann 
1971 [1966]: 69)
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This state of affairs leaves evolutionary psychologists with only 
two  options:  they  must  either  reject  social  constructivism 
altogether,  or  argue  that  social  constructivism  is  not  as  anti-
Darwinian as it might seem. Before we can settle this issue, we must 
describe clearly what we mean by social constructivism. 
The Many Kinds of Social Constructivism
According  to  Hacking,  “[p]eople  begin  to  argue  that  X  is 
socially constructed when they find that in the present state of 
affairs,  X  is  taken  for  granted;  X  appears  to  be  inevitable.” 
(Hacking  1999:  12)  To  this  precondition,  social  constructivists 
usually add three elements: “(1) X need not have existed, or need 
not be at all as it is, is not determined by the nature of things; 
it is not inevitable. Very often they go further, and urge that: (2) 
X is quite bad as it is. (3) We would be much better off if X were 
done away with, or at least radically transformed.” (Hacking 1999: 
6)  Hacking’s  characterization  is  adequate,  even  if  a  little  too 
broad and vague. Even though it has become the canonical definition 
of  social  constructivism,  most  social  constructivists  make  much 
stronger claims than the ones mentioned by Hacking, whose account 
tends  (quite  visibly)  to  obscure  the  important  epistemological 
pillar  of  social  constructivism.  Yes,  social  constructivism  does 
offer ontological and ethical positions, but it is also – we may 
even  say  mainly  –  a  method  of  analyzing  people’s  thoughts  and 
knowledge. Social constructivists believe that one must focus on 
“social epistemology” in order to elucidate how social constructions 
come into being (Brown et al. 1998). If that is the case, then it 
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will  be  useful  to  provide  a  more  stringent  definition  than 
Hacking’s:  (1)  because  social  constructivism,  in  most  instances, 
wants  to  trace  historico-political  principles  as  well  as  the 
consequences of concepts and of their transformations, it analyses 
how  and  why  concepts  and  their  transformations  induce  people  to 
think the way they think and what influence these transformations 
have  on  our  behaviour;  (2)  social  constructivists  assume  that 
“reason”  is,  at  least  partially,  a  function  of  non-reasonable 
processes, and that these non-reasonable forces are closely related 
to power (control/dominance over others/nature); (3) the influence 
of the conceptual transformations can also be seen in the use of 
narratives to structure our world and in the identities with which 
we attempt to navigate it; (4) and finally, social constructivists 
hold that scientific theories do not to escape the more general 
theory-ladenness of human observations. 
This definition is not a reproduction of the problem we complained 
about in the introduction. It should not be seen as a monolithic 
interpretation  of  social  constructivism,  simply  because  the 
different  strands  of  constructivist  thought  –  including  Hackings 
social  constructivism  –  do  not  quarrel  about  these  claims. 
Obviously, it would be silly to deny the differences within the 
broad field of social constructivism, but most - if not all – intra-
constructivist  discussions  are  about  how  to  operationalize  these 
ideas  or  insights,  and  about  the  scope  and/or  reach  of  their 
application. E.g., a great many concepts and forms of “reason” have 
been analysed with the help of social constructivist methods, and 
science  has  been  from  the  very  beginning  one  of  social 
constructivism’s  favourite  targets.  The  upshot  of  a  social 
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constructivist analysis of science is almost always the claim that 
in science everything is invention, nothing discovery (Bunge 1996: 
297).  However,  social  constructivism  can  also  be  more  moderate. 
There is in the social sciences a continuum of acceptance of social 
constructivist  ideas,  and  social  constructivist  researchers  from 
different disciplines vary in the distance along that continuum that 
they are prepared to travel (Burr 1998: 15). Many psychologists, for 
example, often do not regard social constructivism as a profound 
philosophical  criticism  of  the  general  project  of  a  scientific 
psychology,  but  as  a  research  programme  within this  project 
(compare, e.g., Haslam and Levy 2006). That said, it is also the 
case that this moderate social constructivism found in psychology 
holds  a  reflexive  and  critical  stance  towards  the  practice  of 
scientific psychology. 
Still, even a moderate social constructivism sees itself as anti-
naturalistic  (in  a  sociological  sense)  in  general  and  anti-
biologistic in particular. Bruner, for instance, writes that “it is 
culture, not biology, that shapes human life and the human mind, 
that gives meaning to action by situating its underlying intentional 
states in an interpretive system.” (Bruner 1990: 34) Or, as Berger 
and  Luckmann  put  it,  “[t]he  human  organism  lacks  the  necessary 
biological  means  to  provide  stability  for  human  conduct.  Human 
existence, if it were thrown back on its organismic resources by 
themselves, would be existence in some sort of chaos.” (Berger and 
Luckmann 1971 [1966]: 69) Not all social constructivists are this 
dismissive, and many acknowledged that social constructivism is not 
a plea for the absurd claim that there is no such thing as (an 
evolved) human nature. Collier, for instance, writes: 
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There are quite a lot of things which no one can seriously 
dispute  belong  to  human  nature:  we  breathe  oxygen,  use 
language,  cannot  survive  unassisted  in  infancy,  fear  death, 
dislike intense pain, get scurvy if deprived of vitamin C, get 
tense if sexually frustrated, get drunk if we imbibe too much 
alcohol, die if we are plunged into boiling water, and so on. 
Anyone  could  extend  this  list  a  few  pages  without  getting 
controversial. (Collier 1998: 39) 
This  last  position  implies  that  social  constructivism  is  not 
intrinsically opposed to certain evolutionary approaches to human 
psychology, though it is obvious that this compatibility need not 
lead  to  an  integration  of  evolutionary  psychology  and  social 
constructivism. It might also lead to the view that each cobbler has 
to stick to his last. Some evolutionary scholars, for instance, have 
defended the view that both disciplines are consistent and maybe 
even complementary (Mallon and Stich 2000), but that they are not 
synergic because one discipline cannot be substantially enriched by 
the scientific findings of the other (Gintis 2004). What we would 
like to show is that it is not only possible, but desirable, to go 
beyond what is often called “vertical integration” (Barkow 2006). 
The latter indeed seems to imply nothing more than one-way traffic, 
from evolutionary theory towards social constructivism that is. But 
in order to bring about a genuine, horizontal, that is synergic, 
integration  of  the  two  disciplines,  we  need  real  linking  pins, 
allowing  for  interdisciplinary  traffic  in  both directions.  We 
believe  a  good  starting  point  for  finding  these  linking  points 
consists of the evolved social abilities in which social processes 
such as essentialization and identity-formation are grounded. 
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Bridging the Gap
Social constructivism comes in different shapes and sizes, so 
that  we  must  start  by  pinpointing  which  kind  of  social 
constructivism we are trying to connect with evolutionary theory. 
Needless to say, the philosophical strand of social constructivism 
that makes it its business to undermine science as such can never be 
reconciled with evolutionary theory (or with any other scientific 
theory for that matter).ii But even if social constructivism sees 
itself as a discipline within the disciplinary matrix of the more 
“regular” social sciences, reconciliation is still far from evident. 
David  Sloan  Wilson  distinguishes  two  such  social  constructivist 
positions:  the  first  claims  that  individuals  have  enormous 
flexibility,  the  second  that  human  flexibility  is  absolutely 
limitless (Wilson 2005). According to Wilson, the second position is 
exemplifies the “blank slatism” or anti-nativism that can never be 
reconciled with evolutionary approaches to the human mind and to 
human  behaviour.  But  Wilson  does  believe  that  the  first  social 
constructivist  position  may  be  incorporated  into  evolutionary 
positions,  especially  given  the  almost  general  agreement  among 
evolutionists that the potential for change is an important part of 
human nature. In particular, Wilson sees ESC as a middle ground 
between  two  extreme  claims,  namely:  that  the  human  mind  is  a 
flexible and general-purpose learning device; that the mind should 
be seen as a kind of Swiss army knife full of adaptive (or adapted) 
specialized tools — a mirror image, as were, of a discussion endemic 
11
to  the  current  variety  of  evolutionary  approaches  to  human 
behaviour. 
Wilson’s argument is not free of problems. He is obviously right 
that  it  is  easy  to  establish  a  middle-ground  position  between 
extreme  nativism  and  extreme  anti-nativism.  Many  evolutionary 
theorists, Wilson included, have contributed to our understanding of 
the  interaction  between  culture  and  nature  (Pulliam  and  Dunford 
1980; Boyd and Richerson 1985; Cronk et al. 2000). But the problem 
is that Wilson’s description of social constructivism obscures some 
of the more specific social constructivist claims. It is in fact 
true that social constructivism emphasizes the flexibility of human 
nature and the variability of human thinking and behaviour, but is 
also  true  that  the  same  emphasis  can  be  found  in  many  other 
psychological or sociological theories. Hence, if one wants to set 
social constructivism on an evolutionary foundation, one must not 
neglect to take into account its more specific claims.iii 
A number of evolutionists believe that social constructions exist, 
though this does not keep them from being rather sceptical about the 
explanations for their existence offered by social constructivism 
(Plotkin 2002). We want to show that this sceptical attitude is at 
least partially unwarranted, and that the mechanisms described and 
studied  by  social  constructivism  are  objects  susceptible  of 
legitimate  evolutionary  explanations.  In  what  follows,  we  will 
discuss  four  core  elements  of  social  constructivism  we  have 
encountered earlier, and suggest how they may be incorporated into 
evolutionary thinking. These elements should not be seen as part of 
a monolithic interpretation of “social constructivism”. But since 
they are present in nearly every variety of psychological social 
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constructivism, ranging from the extreme social constructivism of 
Gergen (1985) to Hacking’s moderate version of it, an integration or 
reconciliation of these four elements with evolutionary theory is 
necessary to establish a viable ESC. We will address each of our 
social constructivist core elements using the following structure. 
First  we  clarify  what  the  elements  mean  within  social 
constructivism. We then elucidate why, at first sight, they may seem 
difficult  to  reconcile  with  evolutionary  approaches  to  human 
behaviour.  Thirdly,  we  show  how,  nonetheless,  they  could  be 
addressed  within  both  adaptationist  and  non-adaptationist 
evolutionary  frameworks.  Finally,  we  briefly  explicate  the  added 
value of an integrated approach, focusing on the neglected possible 
interdisciplinary  traffic  from  social  constructivism  towards 
evolutionary theory. 
Essentializing Reason
Social constructivists argue that social constructions arise 
when  the  continuous  flow  of  contingencies  is  stabilized  through 
generalizations  and  concepts.  These  concepts,  moreover,  tend  to 
become reified: people start to think that these abstract concepts 
have real and tangible existence. The concept of “mental illness” is 
a good example. Hacking has shown convincingly how “fugue” (Hacking 
1998)  and  “multiple  personality  disorder”  (Hacking  1995)  are 
cultural  artefacts  (“social  constructions”),  since  they  are  not 
bounded entities with fixed properties, and they are not indifferent 
to changing conventions in psychiatric diagnostics. They are not 
natural kinds, in other words, even though most people, including 
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many psychiatrists and their patients, once considered “fugue” and 
“multiple personality disorder” to be natural kinds. 
How  do  these  social  constructivist  approaches  to  “mental 
illness”  compare  with  their  evolutionary  counterparts?  For  one 
thing, it is true that successful social constructivist approaches 
to mental disorders can be fatal for (certain) Darwinian accounts of 
mental disorders (Adriaens 2007). But that is not the real issue 
here. The real issue is whether or not there are good evolutionary 
reasons for our tendency to consider and treat cultural artefacts as 
natural kinds. Why do humans think that words and concepts denote 
natural kinds or essences? Or more precisely, why do we think that 
category membership remains the same despite striking differences 
and/or transformations? Susan Gelman has shown quite convincingly 
that “psychological essentialism”, i.e. the phenomenon that people 
are basically essentialists in their reasoning (Medin 1989), is to a 
large extent innate. Preschool children from a variety of cultural 
contexts treat biological species  and social categories as if both 
had  an  innate  basis,  a  stable  category  membership,  and  sharp 
boundaries (Gelman 2004). 
Some  Darwinians  have  relied  on  the  innate  character  of 
psychological essentialism to suggest that it has an adaptive value 
even if true essences do not exist. Keller and Miller, for instance, 
argue that perceiving mental disorders as a coherent category may 
have been functional 
not because it [the disorder] is a ‘natural kind’ with a common 
aetiology at any level, but because it was evolutionarily or 
culturally  adaptive  for  people  to  categorize  others  in 
particular  ways,  in  order  to  make  certain  social  decisions 
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about them. Thus insanity may be like ugliness, dishonesty, or 
aggressiveness – things to avoid and stigmatize in social and 
sexual  interactions  –  not  because  they  have  a  unitary 
aetiology, but because they have a common set of fitness costs 
for observers. (Keller and Miller 2006: 28) 
Another camp of Darwinian scholars, however, have argued that our 
innate tendency to treat social artefacts as natural kinds is just 
an unwelcome side-effect of a generally beneficial cognitive bias. 
More  specifically,  Atran  has  suggested  that  essentialist 
representational systems guide inductive inference more successfully 
than  other  representational  systems,  at  least  with  regard  to 
biological  taxa  and  biological  substances  (Atran  1990).  The 
essentialization of social constructs or other cultural artefacts 
may result from an overextension of this adaptive system. In Atran’s 
view, essentialism is a domain-specific mode of thinking, part of 
our “natural history module”. But the fact that this module is far 
from  being  fully  encapsulated  means  that  it  allows  for  many 
misfires. Hirschfeld has argued that this position runs aground on 
the fact that the essentialist thinking associated with biological 
taxa  differs  quite  substantially  from  the  kind  of  essentialist 
thinking applied to, e.g., race and ethnicity (Hirschfeld 1996). The 
alternatives he proposes, however, are more concerned with proximate 
than  with  ultimate  or  evolutionary  causes.  Yet,  automatic 
categorization and stereotyping on the basis of rather arbitrary 
group labels can be a necessary precondition for the sustenance of 
adaptive  cooperation  with  ingroup  members  (Axelrod  et  al.  2004; 
compare also McElreath et al. 2003). 
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Our point is that many evolutionists actually agree with social 
constructivists about the fact that psychological essentialism is 
often ontologically unwarranted. Evolutionists also acknowledge that 
psychological  essentialism  may  lead  to  morally  reprehensible 
behaviour and attitudes, like stigmatization and ostracizing. But, 
unlike social constructivists, they add that such essentialism is, 
or was, on average more adaptive than more politically correct (and 
more  adequate)  modes  of  thinking  (Barrett  2001).  By  explicitly 
introducing the social constructivist core element of essentializing 
reason into evolutionary theorizing, however, it becomes possible to 
reorient sometimes heated debates towards more constructive ends. 
This  may  even  lead  to  additional  insights  on  how  to  counteract 
socially  unwarranted  instances  of  essentialist  thinking,  thereby 
enhancing both Darwinism’s and social constructivism’s potential for 
furthering societal change. 
Dominance and Subordination
Like  many  disciplines  in  the  social  sciences,  social 
constructivism focuses its analyses on how power relations influence 
human behaviour. What is distinctive to social constructivism is the 
belief that these power relations are not (only) the outcome of a 
struggle between fully aware subjects striving for power, but they 
result predominantly from social practices and from the language 
used by these social practices. Essentialist social constructions of 
the kind discussed above are indeed often regarded as a function of 
processes associated with dominance and subordination. The so-called 
“birth of the addict” illustrates the social constructivist point. 
Social constructivists argue that “addiction” is best understood not 
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as an independent medical or scientific discovery, but as part of a 
transformation in social thought which corresponds with fundamental 
changes in societal structure. These fundamental changes led to the 
assumption  that  all  social  problems  were  solvable  or  curable 
(Goffman 1968): from then on, all deviant behaviour was treated as 
an abnormality. Individuals who might otherwise have led full, but 
perturbed, lives were from all of a sudden subjected to a form of 
private  exclusion  and  bureaucratic  interference  which  transformed 
what was once seen as somewhat eccentric behaviour into something 
that called for treatment, maybe even institutionalization (Foucault 
2003 [1963]). Strangely enough, the people subjected to this did not 
seem bothered about it themselves. Their ready acceptance of their 
subordinated  position  only  aggravated  their  situation  (Russell 
2002). Looking back at his famous 1973 study about how remarkably 
easy it was for Vietnam vets to kick their addiction to heroin, 
Robins writes: 
Heroin is or was thought of, by law enforcement personnel and 
users  alike,  as  the  ‘worst’  drug,  virtually  instantly  and 
permanently addictive and creating craving so extreme that it 
overcomes all normal ability to resist temptations to theft and 
robbery to acquire it. Users who share that view show by their 
use that they are ready to commit themselves to their concept 
of an addictive life style. The public’s rankings of drugs with 
respect to ‘hardness’ probably has more to do with the drug’s 
legal status, the government’s commitment to discouraging its 
use,  and  its  price,  than  with  any  intrinsic  addictive 
liability. (Robins 1993: 1052) 
From a Darwinian point of view, there is something awkward 
about this process. Because enhancing one’s status is beneficial for 
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one’s reproductive success, selection has built our neuro-endocrinal 
and cognitive-behavioural systems to pursue high positions in social 
hierarchies. So how is it possible that socio-cultural practices 
(modern medicine, psychiatric labelling, legal categories) sometimes 
– or even very often – override our inborn desire for power and 
status? In other words, why do so many of us accept a culture that 
is apparently hostile to our natural inclinations? 
An evolutionary solution to this problem can build on the idea 
that  the  socially  constructed  behaviour  of  the  addict  is  less 
maladaptive  than  it  seems.  For  instance,  the  individual’s 
“commitment to the concept of an addictive life style” can be seen 
as a costly signal (Zahavi 1975) for vigour. Such self-handicapping 
behaviour may not be devoid of social benefits like popularity among 
one’s peers.iv 
Boyd  and  Richerson  suggest  another  solution.  These  authors 
acknowledge the generally adaptive character of culture, but they 
emphasize  in  the  same  breath  that  our  evolved  psychological 
predispositions  to  acquire culture  inherently  contain  the 
possibility of reaching maladaptive outcomes. More specifically, it 
is argued that genetically determined and adaptive learning biases, 
such as conformist and prestige biases, always involve trade-offs 
(Richerson and Boyd 2005; Henrich and Gil-White 2001). The tendency 
to imitate successful and prestigious individuals, for instance, is 
–  under  specific  circumstances  –  favoured  by  selection,  even  if 
making this bias so perfect that it will reliably reject maladaptive 
beliefs over the whole range of social experiences is too costly. 
Boyd and Richerson compare our evolved psychology with the human 
immune system: “The psychology of social learning is like an immune 
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system in that it is adapted to absorb beneficial ideas but resist 
maladaptive ones. And like the immune system it is not always able 
to keep up with rapidly evolving cultural pathogens”. (Richerson and 
Boyd 2005: 165) In short, there is a good evolutionary explanation 
for  why  some  of  us  willingly  accept  the  concepts  and  thought-
processes  that  determine  our  subordination,  especially  if  these 
concepts and beliefs are held by our peers (conformist bias) or by 
prestigious individuals (prestige bias). 
Here,  incorporating  social  constructivist  sensitivities  into 
evolutionary  approaches  to  human  behaviour  opens  up  more 
possibilities to consider ways in which evolution can explain why we 
socially  construct  things,  rather  than  limiting  the  inquiry  to 
investigating how evolution could explain these social constructs 
directly.  This  considerably  broadens  the  scope  of  hypotheses  to 
consider  when  studying  dominance  and  subordination  from  an 
evolutionary perspective. 
Narratives and Identities
The overwhelming importance of language returns – and with a 
vengeance  at  that  –  in  the  emphasis  on  narratives:  social 
constructivists are fond of pointing out whenever they can that that 
the construction of reality takes on a narrative form (Bruner 1991). 
Social constructivists argue, persuasively, that narratives are a 
pervasive feature of the reality of everyday life which shape not 
only our modes of thought but also, and perhaps more importantly, 
reality  itself,  giving  meaning  and  a  sense  of  coherence  to  it 
(Baudrillard 1996). In discussing what they call the “politics of 
narrative”, Hinchman and Hinchman note that “[p]eople tell stories 
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because they need to know who they are and how to behave in a world 
that is complex and often dangerous” (Hinchman and Hinchman 1997: 
xxviii).  Social  constructivists  nonetheless  often  focus  their 
analyses on the dysfunctional effects of narratives on individuals 
of our species. If humans use stories for their own benefit, it 
seems no less true that stories may use humans. 
Besides stressing the importance of narratives for structuring the 
world surrounding us, social constructivists also see narratives as 
playing a crucial role in the formation and maintenance of social 
and personal identities (Nelson 2003; Gergen and Gergen 1983; Singer 
2004;  Harré  2002;  Callero  2003;  Giddens  1984).  Groups  and 
individuals alike employ stories to invest themselves (and others) 
with a sense of integrity. 
More so than is the case for the other social constructivist 
core elements, the core element of narratives and identities has 
already gained some foothold in evolutionary theorizing about human 
behaviour.  Darwinian  scholars,  however,  are  in  general  more 
interested in accounting for the human story-telling capacity as 
such, and for the recurrent features of the resulting narratives. 
They also tend to emphasize stable dispositional personality traits 
over and above narrative features of identities. 
According to Scalise Sugiyama, for example, the fact that there 
is what she calls a “thematic universality” to narratives “lends 
support to the hypothesis that storytelling originally emerged as a 
means of storing and transmitting certain types of fitness-related 
information”  (Scalise  Sugiyama  2001:  242).  Other  evolutionary 
accounts  of  the  origin  of  narrative  focus  more  on  the  relation 
between  narratives  and  literature  as  a  form  of  art  in  general 
20
(Carroll 2004; Wilson 1998). One hypothesis, for instance, holds 
that the arts evolved to solve a new adaptive problem, namely the 
confusion and uncertainty that goes hand in hand with a sharpened 
intelligence. The ability to create simulated realities would have 
allowed  humans  to  deal  adaptively  with  the  downsides  of  their 
otherwise very useful big brains. For these evolutionists, social 
constructivists are on the right track when they assume that stories 
are more or less trustworthy guides in a dangerous world. 
Even if the emphasis on the autonomous power of stories that can be 
found in social constructivism may clash with evolutionary theories 
about the origins of story-telling, scholars who regard themselves 
as adaptationists would be the first to acknowledge that once the 
capacity to narrate is in place, the spread of stories need not 
necessarily entail a match between the (groups of) organisms that 
somehow propagate them, and the environments in which they live. 
Memetics enthusiasts like Dennett (1995) are quite fond of stressing 
the virus-like qualities of catchy stories, which tend to infect 
their hosts in a non-adaptive fashion. 
As to the matter of identities, there is no doubt that evolutionary 
psychologists and (human) behavioural ecologists alike might quibble 
with  social  constructivists  –  and  with  good  reason  –  about  the 
extent to which certain personality traits are hard-wired adaptive 
results of natural and sexual selection (Buss 1991; Dall et al. 
2004; Nettle 2006; compare also MacDonald 1998). 
But there would be little reason to do the same with regard to 
identity-formation  in  the  sense  commonly  used  by  social 
constructivists.  Evolutionists  of  various  denominations  are  well 
aware of the fact that one can differentiate between organisms or 
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biological  individuals  and  persons  or  “people”  (Dennett  1988; 
Sterelny 2003; Ross 2006). Indeed, most of them, albeit to varying 
degrees, agree that non-genetic input is required to endow us with 
human  identities.  Typical  Darwinian  accounts  of  “how  cultural 
symbionts  turn  primates  into  persons”  (Dennett  2003:  170)  thus 
already  acknowledge  the  largely  “storied”  nature  of  the  self. 
Indeed, these and similar accounts seem to accept the importance of 
narratives  as  vessels  for  the  transmission  of  the  ideational 
entities that constitute our identities. They also provide us with a 
possible explanation for both biologically adaptive and (seemingly 
or effectively) maladaptive personal identities; as such, they are 
open to the same arguments we put forward with regards to dominance 
and subordination, and to essentializing reason. 
So  it  would  seem  that  evolutionary  and  constructivist 
approaches to narrativity generally and the role of narratives in 
constituting identities, are to a large extent running on the same 
track. In any case, interdisciplinary research that is certainly not 
averse  to  evolutionary  thinking  already  appears  well  underway, 
providing  a  good  illustration  of  the  power  of  an  integrated 
approach. Fireman et al. (2003) for instance use what they call the 
“expanded  natural  method”  to  investigate  how  exactly  narratives 
contribute to the formation of selves. Their method involves amongst 
other things psychology, neurobiology, anthropology, literature, as 
well as – quite unavoidably – some evolutionary theory. Likewise, 
acknowledging  that  “[p]ersonality  is  an  individual’s  unique 
variation  on  the  general  evolutionary  design  for  human  nature”, 
McAdams and Pals (2006: 212) aim to combine social constructivist 
insights with evolutionary ones in one and the same framework. 
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Theory-ladenness of Observation
Finally, social constructivists believe that language and the 
narratives it makes possible shape our knowledge of the world. Our 
observations are said to be at least partially influenced by the 
concepts  and  stories  that  our  society  has  adopted  (Hanson  1958; 
Quine 1960; Kuhn 1970; Berger and Luckmann 1971 [1966]). Different 
conceptual  or  theoretical  backgrounds  give  rise  to  qualitatively 
different perceptions. Social constructivism never misses a chance 
to emphasize just how theory-laden our observations are, and how 
this  fact  undermines,  in  their  view,  the  objectivity  of  science 
(Latour  and  Woolgar  1979).  Scientists  belong  to  a  field  staffed 
predominantly by other males and funded by the wheels of capitalist 
society, and so their views are profoundly affected by sexism and 
capitalism. Current science is just the continuation of politics by 
other  means.  This  is  (supposedly)  reflected  in  the  scientists’ 
choice of subjects and in the outcomes of their studies. 
Evolutionary psychology, for instance, focuses excessively on 
sex  differences  and  cheating,  and  finds  that  men  are  primarily 
attracted by women with a 0,7 waist-hip ratio. They (often) bring to 
their  work  the  cultural  values  of  their  sex,  race,  and  class 
(Haraway 1989), thus carrying on a tradition that was started by 
Darwin himself, as Michael Ruse has noted: “Not only do we learn 
[from The Descent of Men] that men are strong and brave and brainy, 
whereas women are kind and gentle and sensitive; that whites are 
intelligent and hard working whereas blacks are stupid and lazy; but 
that, on the whole, capitalism is not a bad thing.” (Ruse 1999: 70) 
Unfortunately,  it  would  appear  to  be  the  case  that  the  social 
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constructivist core element of the theory-ladenness of observation 
would even be particularly damning for evolutionary theory. However, 
the issue at stake here is not only how evolutionary psychologists 
and  other  Darwinian  scientists  can  avoid  the  pitfalls  of  doing 
ideologically  driven  (pseudo-)science,  but  also  why human 
observations are in general theory-laden. 
Some evolutionary psychologists think that this is simply a bad 
question.  They  bluntly  reject  Hanson’s  description  of  how  our 
observations  are  theory-laden  by  adopting  a  modular  view  of  the 
mind. Even if many evolutionists quarrel with Fodor’s view of the 
modular nature of central systems (Sperber 1996), they agree with 
him at least on the following point: 
If perceptual processes are modular, then by definition, bodies 
of theory that are inaccessible to the modules ‘do not affect 
the way the perceiver sees the world’. Specifically, perceivers 
who differ profoundly in their background theories […] might 
nevertheless see the world in exactly the same way, so long as 
the bodies of theory that they disagree about are inaccessible 
to their perceptual mechanisms. (Fodor 1983: 38) 
While the emphasis on the mind’s modularity is to some extent at 
right  angles  with  Hanson’s  view  of  our  observation’s  theory-
ladenness,  it  does  not  completely  do  away  with  the  notion  that 
theories  affect  our  perception  and  thinking.  Evolutionary 
psychologists hold that different perceivers see the world in the 
same way in part because the innate perceptual and other modules of 
different people share the same content. We perceive the world and 
reason about the world with the help of evolutionarily helpful and 
more  or  less  hard-wired  “theories”  (theory  of  mind,  intuitive 
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physics), theories that are universal because they were shaped by 
similar environmental conditions. 
Obviously,  when  social  constructivists  emphasize  the  theory-
ladenness of observation, they are not talking or thinking about 
this  modular  kind  of  theory-ladenness.  Social  constructivists 
suppose  an  enormous  flexibility  of  the  human  mind  which 
fundamentally blurs the distinction between theory and observation, 
because  the  theories  we  have  learned or  acquired in  our  social 
environments determine what we perceive and how we perceive it. But 
the  “theory-informity”  of  observation  (Hibberd  2005)  is  not 
necessarily at odds with the weak version of mental modularity most 
evolutionists  have  adopted.  Carruthers’  defence  of  the  massive 
modularity  hypothesis,  for  instance,  still  allows  for  (a) 
flexibility  in  the  mind’s  processing  of  information,  (b)  a 
substantial influence from the (social) environment on the fine-
tuning and even the construction of modules, and (c) the presence of 
mechanisms of intermodular integration (Carruthers 2006). Likewise, 
the proposals put forward by Mithen (1996) and Sperber (1996) seem 
to  go  at  least  some  way  in  blurring  the  dividing  line  between 
cognition  and  perception,  thus  allowing  the  distinction  between 
theory and observation to be relaxed, in much the same way as more 
moderate social constructivists envisage it. 
Both stronger and weaker evolutionary takes on modularity can 
profit from taking seriously the more moderate social constructivist 
approaches  to  the  theory-ladenness  of  observation,  scientific  or 
otherwise. For instance, research into these modules could thus shed 
light  on  how  exactly  the  innate theory-ladenness  of  observation 
affects  scientific  theorizing  (see,  e.g.,  De  Cruz  and  De  Smedt 
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2007).  Conversely,  if  cognitive  fluidity  appears  to  lie  at  the 
origin of science, as Mithen (1996) claims, this undoubtedly helps 
to explain why it is not immune to knowledge acquired through social 
transmission. 
Discussion and Conclusion
It  may  be  unfortunate  for  some  that  not  everyone  “reading 
Evolutionary Psychology is above taking social constructionism and 
environmentalism seriously” (Kanazawa 2006: 103).v We have tried in 
this  paper  to  take  social  constructivism  seriously  by  taking  a 
closer look at some of its core elements, which are often overlooked 
in evolutionary attempts at reconciliation. The theoretical core of 
social  constructivism  revolves  around  essentializing  reason, 
dominance  and  subordination,  narratives  and  identities,  and  the 
theory-ladenness of observation. And we have argued that a viable 
ESC must be able to incorporate these elements into its theoretical 
framework. We have shown to that end that such an ESC can explain 
(a) why these core elements exist, (b) what the function is of the 
adaptive  core  elements  of  social  constructivism,  and  (c)  what 
evolutionary  reasoning  can  add  to  the  study  of  the  non-adaptive 
(maladaptive, vestigial, …) core elements. This places ESC firmly 
within naturalist approaches, even though its naturalism is quite 
broadly  conceived.  Conversely,  we  have  tried  to  demonstrate  how 
specific social constructivist sensitivities can complete strictly 
evolutionary approaches. 
Our view is that this opens up the possibility for a genuine cross-
fertilization between two actually quite adjacent approaches. We are 
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well  aware,  of  course,  that  readers  with  a  more  social 
constructivist orientation could, should they be so inclined, simply 
dispose of our proposal as yet one more attempt at the “nihilation” 
of  their  views.  According  to  Berger  and  Luckmann,  “nihilation 
involves  the  more  ambitious  attempt  to  account  for  all  deviant 
definitions of reality in terms of concepts belonging to one’s own 
universe”.  (Berger  and  Luckmann  1971  [1966]:  133)vi We  can  only 
stress once more that this is not our intention. Moreover, a few 
examples from different fields of enquiry may clarify even more the 
potential  usefulness  of  a  genuine  and  more  carefully  elaborated 
middle-ground position like the ESC we have presented in this paper. 
Consider for instance the field of comparative law. One of the more 
recent theoretical currents in comparative legal studies, sometimes 
called  “difference  theory”,  emphasizes  the  overwhelmingly 
constructed  nature  of  culturally  grounded  legal  systems.  For 
instance,  Legrand  claims  that  comparatists  “must  purposefully 
privilege the identification of differences across the laws they 
compare” (Legrand 2001: 1049). Better still, “in the quest for thick 
or deep understanding, the comparatist must maintain alterity in its 
specificity while at all times avoiding the tendency to essentialize 
it” (Legrand 2003: 297). Other contributions in more or less the 
same theoretical vein highlight other core constructivist elements, 
such as the theory-ladenness of observation (see, e.g., Ainsworth 
1996;  Curran  1998).  Conversely,  other  legal  theorists  explicitly 
point to evolutionary psychology and related efforts in cognitive 
anthropology  as  a  way  to  understand  the  equally  remarkable 
similarities amongst various legal systems. For instance, according 
to Jones “the legal features of any legal system [...] will also 
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reflect specific features of evolved, species-typical, human brain 
design” (Jones 2001: 858). Caterina, for his part, interprets the 
resurgence  of  nativist  theorizing  as  a  rebuttal  of  more  radical 
versions of difference theory that at the same time opens up new 
possibilities for the comparative study of law (Caterina 2004). 
ESC can make forcefully clear that both stances obviously have it 
right, to a certain degree, and can explain why – in both Darwinian 
senses of the word – this is so. This enables us to reframe naïve 
versions of both extreme stances. What ESC adds to this perhaps 
somewhat less exciting – but, given the amount of scholarly debate 
still surrounding these matters, no less important – assertion, is a 
way to assess to what extent either of them is right and how they 
effectively  interact  in  producing  certain  outcomes  that  would 
otherwise be difficult to explain. 
The latter can be illustrated more concretely by the example of 
homosexuality. In a recent paper, Adriaens and De Block have argued 
that (occasional) same-sex sexual behaviour has a long evolutionary 
history, as is obvious from the fact that same-sex sexuality is part 
of the behavioural repertoire of many animal species. Such same-sex 
sexuality (in humans and other animals) may have been designed by 
natural selection to create or strengthen male-male alliances by 
allowing  marginal  males  to  reposition  themselves  in  the  group 
hierarchy.  Adriaens  and  De  Block  claim,  however,  that  exclusive 
homosexuality is truly an eighteenth century social construction, 
though  they  also  argue  that  this  fact  need  not  imply  that  some 
aspects of this new kind of homosexuality cannot also be illuminated 
by  evolutionary  theory  (Adriaens  and  De  Block  2006).  More 
specifically, they show that the socio-historical conditions around 
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1700 were in fact quite similar to the conditions that once led, in 
our  ancestral  environment,  to  a  substantial  increase  in,  and 
intensification of, same-sex sexual behaviour – conditions that are 
accounted for quite well by the alliance formation hypothesis. In 
other  words,  cultural  processes  may  generate  superstimuli,  which 
release  strong  homoerotic  tendencies.  These  strong  homoerotic 
tendencies  are  not  identical  to  the  homosexual  identity,  but  it 
seems at least likely that they pave the way for the construction of 
such an identity. 
Even  areas  where  “narrow”  evolutionary  approaches  score  heavily, 
such as human avoidance of close inbreeding and kin detection (Van 
den Berghe 1983; Lieberman et al. 2007; but see Kitcher 1985), would 
seem to fall within the scope of ESC's line of reasoning. Against 
the followers of Levi-Strauss, Freud and Durkheim, Lieberman and 
colleagues argue persuasively that incest avoidance makes perfect 
sense  from  a  Darwinian  point  of  view  because  close  inbreeding 
increases expression of deleterious recessive genes. They also show 
that such adaptive incest avoidance might generate opposition to 
incest  in  others  either  as  a  by-product  of  self-regulation  or 
because most third parties that an individual could influence in the 
ancestral environment were kin (Lieberman et al. 2003). However, 
there  are  at  least  three  reasons  why  this  valuable  evolutionary 
approach would benefit from ESC. First, many evolutionary authors 
mix up incest and inbreeding (Spain 1987), thereby leaving out the 
likely  exploitation  of  a  biological  outbreeding  avoidance  by 
cultural kin terms (Cronk 1999). Social constructivists expose this 
omission, by emphasizing that meaning matters and that the meaning 
of cultural terms such as “incest” or “family” often influence human 
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behavior. Or as Berger and Luckmann put it: “the incest taboo itself 
is nothing but the negative side of an assemblage of typifications, 
which define in the first place which sexual conduct is incestuous 
and which is not.” (Berger and Luckmann 1971 [1966]: 73). ESC would 
only  add  to  this  “pure”  social  constructivist  claim  that  the 
direction,  in  which  the  meaning  of  cultural  terms  steers  human 
behavior,  makes  evolutionary  sense.  Secondly,  the  “natural”  and 
adaptive character of sexual aversion towards close relatives, does 
not  exclude  the  possibility  that  a  law  that  strictly  forbids 
incestuous relationships can – at least slightly – transform our 
attitude towards incest. Such a law may have effects on the emotions 
experienced by victims and wrong-doers. And if the law is seen as 
sacred (a “taboo”), one can expect that it will perhaps affect the 
desires of the individuals subjected to it, for instance because 
incest  is  presented  as  a  privilege  of  the  gods  or  the  nobility 
(Serrano  and  Gunzburger  1983).  Incest  is  then  no  longer  simply 
disgusting, but can also become a forbidden and fascinating fruit. 
This transformation is not irreconcilable with evolutionary theory, 
nor is it just a complement of it: it is exactly what one would 
expect, given the – on average – adaptive character of a prestige 
bias and of our evolved tendency to rely on stories as guides for 
our  own  behaviour.  Thirdly,  the  categories  “incest  victim”  and 
“sexual abuser” are often treated as natural kinds, with more or 
less  stable  category  membership.  Yet,  historical  and  social-
constructivist research has revealed that the essence ascribed to 
the “incest victim” and the “abusing father” depends to a large 
extent  on  socio-political  circumstances  and  psychiatric  practices 
(Guarnieri 1998; Hacking 1995). More often than not, evolutionists 
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neglect  these  social  facts.  And  while  social  constructivists 
recognize  the  importance  of  these  ontologically  unwarranted 
essentializations and their effects, they leave the social factors 
largely unexplained, primarily because they think that the socio-
cultural realm is autonomous. Hence, the surplus value of ESC for 
this  debate  is  quite  obvious.  ESC  could  correct  (1)  the  naïve 
evolutionary belief that cultural identities play no role in the 
motives  and  effects  of  incest,  and  (2)  the  naïve  social 
constructivist  belief  that  the  psychology  of  incest  victims  and 
abusers is not an evolved psychology. Most importantly, however, ESC 
may also generate new hypotheses on, e.g., the question  why some 
people willingly accept the label of abuser. 
To  conclude,  our  central  claim  is  that  incorporating  social 
constructivist  elements  into  evolutionary  approaches  to  human 
thought  and  behaviour  has  important  benefits  for  both  parties. 
Social  constructivism  derives  from  it  the  benefit  of  a  solid 
foundation  in  the  natural  sciences.  Social  constructivist  ideas 
which  had  previously  been  regarded  as  problematic,  may  gain 
legitimacy  when  viewed  from  an  evolutionary  perspective.  For 
evolutionists, ESC offers a wider assortment of methods to study the 
interplay between culture and human nature. ESC is likely to be an 
indispensable building block for actually realizing the synthetic 
potential the neo-Darwinian theory of evolution has to offer to the 
social sciences. 
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